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Abstract 
The mere exposure (ME) effect refers to the well-established finding that people evaluate a 
stimulus more positively after repeated exposure to it. So far, the vast majority of studies on 
ME effects have examined changes in explicit stimulus evaluation. We describe the results of 
three large-scale studies (combined N = 3623) that examined ME effects on implicit stimulus 
evaluation. We looked at three moderators of these effects, the implicit evaluation measure, 
the number of stimulus presentations, and memory for presentation frequency. We observed 
ME effects on implicit stimulus evaluations as measured with an Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) and Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), but not an Evaluative Priming Task (EPT). 
ME effects were more robust when there were relatively few stimulus presentations and when 
participants had accurate memory for the presentatio  frequencies. We discuss how these 
findings relate to ME effects on explicit evaluations as well as theoretical and practical 
implications. 
Keywords: mere exposure, implicit evaluation, frequency memory, IAT, evaluative priming 
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Mere Exposure Effects on Implicit Stimulus Evaluation: The Moderating Role of 
Evaluation Task, Number of Stimulus Presentations, and Memory for Presentation 
Frequency 
The mere exposure (ME) effect refers to the finding that people tend to prefer stimuli 
with which they have more experience (Zajonc, 1968). The ME effect is a robust (Bornstein, 
1989) and ubiquitous finding in psychology. For instance, ME effects have been observed in 
research on novel products (Janiszewski, 1993), food preferences (Pliner, 1982), and racial 
prejudice (Zebrowitz, White, & Wieneke, 2008). Whereas an abundant number of studies 
have examined ME effects on explicit stimulus evaluations as captured by self-reported liking 
and choice preference measures, only a handful of studies have investigated ME effects on 
automatic (i.e., implicit) stimulus evaluations as captured by implicit evaluation measures (see 
below for an overview). This is a significant lacuna in ME research because implicit 
evaluation is often considered to be an important determinant of a wide range of behaviors in 
different domains of psychology such as consumer purchases, voting choices, or addictive 
behaviors. Indeed, several reviews and meta-analyses indicate that measures of implicit 
evaluation complement other measures of (explicit) evaluation and explain important 
additional variance in behavior under certain conditions (De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, 
Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; 
Eschenbeck, Heim-Dreger, Steinhilber, & Kohlmann, 2016), especially in the context of more 
automatic or spontaneous behavior (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Eschenbeck 
et al., 2016; Friese, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2009). Hence, the practical usefulness of MEfor 
changing behavior might depend on whether, and under what circumstances, ME procedures 
influence implicit stimulus evaluations.  
Furthermore, the question of whether ME can lead to changes in implicit stimulus 
evaluations is also important for evaluating theoretical accounts of ME effects such as the 
processing fluency/attribution account (e.g., Bornstei  & D’Agostino, 1994). This account 
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postulates that repeated exposure to a stimulus reslts in facilitated processing fluency. This 
fluency experience can be misattributed to stimulus properties that a participant is asked to 
rate (such as valence). In accordance with this account, ME effects have also been observed 
on rated stimulus dimensions other than valence, such as the prototypicality, truth, or 
brightness of a stimulus (e.g., Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt, 1987). Importantly, 
according to certain interpretations of the processing fluency/attribution account, ME does not 
produce changes in a person’s genuine liking of a stimulus but only facilitates changes in 
overt reports of stimulus evaluation as a consequence of being asked to provide evaluative 
stimulus ratings (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). Hence, th re are reasons to suspect that ME effects 
might occur only when participants are required to complete measures of explicit evaluation 
(allowing for misattribution of the fluency experience to liking), but not when they complete 
measures of implicit evaluation. 
In contrast, alternative accounts of ME effects assume that ME leads to an immediate 
change in liking that is not critically dependent o the (explicit) measurement of evaluation. 
For instance, the hedonic-fluency account (e.g., Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001) assumes that 
processing fluency is an inherently positive experience and, therefore, repeated exposure to a 
stimulus leads to a genuine change in the liking of a stimulus. Some have argued that this 
effect should be more easily observed on implicit evaluation measures because these 
measures are more sensitive to evaluations that arise from unconscious influences such as 
fluency experiences (e.g., Kawakami, 2012).  
Propositional accounts of ME effects, which assume that ME effects depend on the 
acquisition of propositional knowledge about the frquency of exposure to a stimulus, also 
predict ME effects on implicit evaluation (Van Dessl, Mertens, Smith, & De Houwer, 2017). 
For instance, when participants infer that a frequently occurring stimulus is positive (e.g., 
because such stimuli are safe and harmless, Zajonc, 2001), this newly acquired information 
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may influence both explicit and implicit stimulus evaluation (see De Houwer, 2014). Such 
inferences might occur under certain conditions of automaticity (e.g., unaware or 
uncontrolled; see Van Dessel, Hughes, & De Houwer, 2018). 
Relatively few studies have examined ME effects on implicit evaluation. First, three 
studies (i.e., Kawakami, 2012; Kawakami & Yoshida, 2015; Smith, Dijksterhuis, & Chaiken, 
2008, Experiment 3) demonstrated subliminal ME effects on implicit measures (i.e., the affect 
misattribution procedure [AMP], single-category implicit association test [SC-IAT], and the 
evaluative priming task [EPT], respectively). These studies involved 10-13 ms repeated 
presentations of either face stimuli or Nepalese signs, followed by a mask to prevent 
conscious reports of the stimuli. Because many recent studies have cast doubt on reported 
evidence for subliminal perception effects (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; 
Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2016; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & Gast, 2016), we 
calculated Bayes Factors for the reported tests in hese studies. These Bayes factors provide 
an indication of how strongly the data support either the null hypothesis (BF0; reflecting the 
absence of an effect) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1; reflecting the presence of an effect). 
BFs between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, and larger than 10, respectively designate ‘anecdotal 
evidence’, ‘substantial evidence’, and ‘strong evidnce’ for the tested hypothesis – most 
commonly the null (BF0) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1) (Jeffreys, 1961). Overall, 
evidence in favor of the effects was low (BF1s < 3), with the exception of one reported effect 
in Kawakami & Yoshida (2015, Experiment 2: BF1 = 28.42). 
Second, two supraliminal ME studies have also used implicit evaluation measures. 
However, these studies did not focus on the effect of ME on the evaluation of specific stimuli, 
but rather on the effects of ME on the evaluation of categories of stimuli (e.g., the implicit 
evaluation of Japanese writing systems following exposure to exemplars of words written in 
those writing systems; Kawakami, Sato, & Yoshida, 2010) and on general positive affect (e.g., 
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the overall evaluation of artificial words following exposure to Chinese ideographs: Hicks & 
King, 2011).  
Third, ME effects have been reported on psychophysiolog cal measures such as facial 
electromyography (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2010; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; 
Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006; Witvliet & Vrana, 2007). However, it is 
unclear to what extent psychophysiological responses reflect implicit evaluation (De Houwer 
& Moors, 2010). Finally, a recent set of studies demonstrated that ME instructions (i.e., 
instructions about the number of upcoming presentations of stimuli in the absence of actual 
presentations) can influence implicit evaluations of individual stimuli (Van Dessel, Mertens, 
Smith, & De Houwer, 2017). However, it is not clear whether ME instruction effects rely on 
the same mechanisms as ME effects instantiated throug  actual stimulus presentations. Hence, 
currently there is only limited evidence that ME through actual stimulus presentations can 
influence the implicit evaluation of those stimuli. 
In the current study, we investigated whether ME can influence implicit evaluations 
and additionally assessed three potential boundary conditions of ME effects on implicit 
evaluation. First, we examined whether ME effects depend on the task that is used to measure 
implicit stimulus evaluations. More specifically, we examined ME effects on implicit 
evaluations as measured with the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), EPT (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) and AMP (Payne, Ch ng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). 
These three tasks were chosen because (1) they constitute the most widely used tasks to 
measure implicit evaluation, (2) they are differentially sensitive to a number of factors other 
than the to-be-measured psychological construct of implicit evaluation (e.g., extra-personal 
knowledge: Olson & Fazio, 2004; salience asymmetries: Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) and 
are thus assumed to involve different underlying processes (De Houwer et al., 2009), and (3) 
they conform with important normative criteria of implicit evaluation measures to a different 
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extent (De Houwer et al., 2009). For the sake of comparison, we have also included a measure 
of explicit stimulus evaluation (i.e., a self-reported liking rating scale).  
Second, we manipulated the number of stimulus presentations in the ME task. 
Previous research has shown that this can be an important moderator of ME effects on explicit 
stimulus evaluations (Bornstein, 1989; Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998). It is typically observed 
that a minimum number of stimulus presentations is needed to produce a ME effect, yet the 
ME effect also seems to decrease in size after a relativ ly small number of stimulus 
presentations (e.g., 10-20 presentations) (Bornstein, 1989; Montoya, Horton, Vevea, 
Citkowicz, & Lauber, 2017; Zajonc, Shaver, Tavris, & van Kreveld, 1972). We examined 
whether this moderation is also observed for ME effects on implicit evaluations. 
Third, we investigated whether ME effects depend on participants’ memory for the 
stimulus presentation frequencies. There is much debate about the importance of this factor 
for ME effects (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Newell & Shanks, 2007; Stafford & Grimes, 
2012). Whereas some authors have stressed that memory for the presentation frequencies (and 
even conscious recognition of the stimuli at the time of exposure) is not necessary for, or 
could even hamper, ME effects (Bornstein, 1989; Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000), other 
authors argue that memory for presentation frequencies is an important moderator of the ME 
effect (Brooks & Watkins, 1989; Newell & Shanks, 2007; Stafford & Grimes, 2012). This 
discrepancy may be due to the fact that some studies us d small samples thus leading to more 
unreliable effects (Bornstein, 1989; Stafford & Grimes, 2012). In-line with Bar-Anan, De 
Houwer, and Nosek (2010), who investigated the relationship between memory of stimulus-
stimulus contingencies and evaluative conditioning (EC) in a large sample, we recruited a 
large number of participants to investigate the relationship between memory of stimulus 
presentation frequencies and ME effects. To gain information about the strength of evidence 
for the presence or absence of ME effects for participants with either accurate or inaccurate 
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presentation frequency memory, we supplemented traditional t-test analyses with Bayesian 
analyses (Dienes, 2011; Wagenmakers, 2007).  
To address the above-mentioned questions, we conducted three large-scale 
experiments. All experiments used the same general procedure to manipulate the amount of 
exposure to different stimuli (Experiment 1 and 2: nonwords; Experiment 3: unknown 
brands). After the ME phase implicit evaluations were measured with either the IAT 
(Experiment 1, Experiment 2), EPT (Experiment 2), or AMP (Experiment 3). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 892, 1392, and 1339 visitors to the Project Implicit research website 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu) in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Prior to data-collection, 
target sample size of Experiment 3 was pre-registered together with the study design, data-
analysis plan and the described hypotheses. These pr -registered plans as well as experiment 
scripts, stimuli, data, and analysis code of all experiments are available at https://osf.io/dnqcs/. 
In-line with standard procedures of data-reduction for Project Implicit data (e.g., Smith, De 
Houwer, & Nosek, 2013), we excluded data of participants who (1) did not complete all tasks 
(131 participants in Experiment 1: 14.7%; 184 participants in Experiment 2: 13.2%; 171 
participants in Experiment 3: 12.8%), (2) had error rates above 30% when considering all 
critical IAT test blocks or above 40% for any one of these blocks (12 participants in 
Experiment 1, 1.6%; 9 participants in Experiment 2, 0.8%), (3) had error rates in the EPT that 
exceeded the population mean by more than 2.5 standard eviations (8 participants in 
Experiment 2: 0.7%, population mean = 7.2%, SD = 10.7%), or (4) used the same response 
key in the AMP for more than 90% of the trials (211 participants: 15.8%). The analyses were 
performed on the data of 749 participants (61.2% women, mean age = 35 years, SD = 13, 
range = 18-79) in Experiment 1, 1191 participants (63.6% women, mean age = 32 years, SD = 
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13, range = 18-76) in Experiment 2, and 956 participants (58.1% women, mean age = 31 
years, SD = 13, range = 18-77) in Experiment 3. 
Procedure 
ME phase. After participants gave informed consent, they were told that they would 
see one or more stimuli (words in Experiments 1 and 2, novel food brands in Experiment 3) 
presented on the screen sequentially, that is, one after the other. They were asked to pay close 
attention to the stimuli because this would be vital for the successful completion of the 
study. Participants then went through a ME phase in which they saw presentations of two non-
existing words “FEVKANI” and “LOKANTA” (Experiments 1-2) or three novel brand names 
with logos (Empeya, Levida, and Witkap). The stimuli remained on the screen for 1000 ms 
with a 1000 ms inter-trial interval. The number of stimulus presentations was manipulated 
between-subjects such that for participants in Experiment 1: (1) one word was presented two 
times and the other word was never presented (0-2 condition), (2) one word was presented 
three times and the other word was presented once (1-3 condition), (3) one word was 
presented six times and the other word was presented once (1-6 condition), or (4) one word 
was presented twelve times and the infrequent word as presented once (1-12 condition). In 
Experiment 2, there were only two stimulus pair conditions: the 0-2 condition and the 1-12 
condition. These conditions were selected because they were the conditions in which we had 
observed the strongest ME effects on implicit evaluation in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, 
all participants saw one brand twelve times, one brand two times, and one brand was never 
presented (0-2-12 condition). Which specific word o brand was presented more often was 
counterbalanced across participants and stimulus pair conditions. The order of the stimulus 
presentations within the ME phase was randomized.  
Explicit evaluation. For half of the participants of Experiments 1 and 3, the ME phase 
was followed by an explicit evaluation task, which was then followed by the implicit 
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evaluation task. The other participants first completed the implicit evaluation task and then 
the explicit evaluation task. In Experiment 2, all participants first completed the implicit 
evaluation tasks and then completed the explicit evaluation task. In the explicit evaluation 
task, participants indicated liking ratings of each of the two nonwords (Experiments 1 and 2) 
or three brand names (Experiment 3) by selecting an option on a 9-point Likert scale (1= not 
liked at all; 9 = completely liked) from a dropdown list on separate pages. The Likert scale for 
the different stimuli were presented in random order. 
IAT (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 1, all participants completed the IAT; in 
Experiment 2, half of the participants completed an IAT and the other participants completed 
an EPT. In the IAT, participants were asked to sorttimuli by pressing either the “E” or the “I” 
on the keyboard. On each trial, a word was presented i  the center of the screen until the 
participant pressed one of the two keys. If the respon e was correct, the word disappeared and 
the next word was presented 400 ms later. If the response was incorrect, the word was 
replaced by a red “X”. The next word appeared 400 ms after participants pushed the correct 
button. In the first block, participants categorized FEVKANI and LOKANTA as their 
respective names. To avoid classification of the target stimuli based only on simple perceptual 
features, the words were presented in different font types (Arial Black and Fixedsys), 
capitalizations (uppercase and lowercase), and sizes (16pt and 18pt), resulting in 8 different 
stimuli for each nonword. Category labels were presented in the top left and right corner to 
aid classification. After 20 trials, participants categorized ten attribute words as ‘Good’ 
(wonderful, glorious, marvelous, success, peace) or ‘Bad’ (nasty, failure, agony, unpleasant, 
evil) with the “E” and the “I” buttons for 20 trials. Next, participants completed 20 practice 
trials and 40 critical trials in which both attribute and target words were categorized and in 
which FEVKANI and positive stimuli shared the same response key and LOKANTA and 
negative stimuli shared the other response key (or vice versa). Participants then practiced 
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sorting target words with the response key assignment r versed for 40 trials. Finally, 
participants completed 20 practice and 40 critical trials with the new response key 
assignment.  
 EPT (Experiment 2). At the start of the EPT, participants were told that words would 
appear one after the other on the screen and that their task was to categorize the words as 
either "good" or "bad" using the ‘E’ and ‘I’ keys of a computer keyboard as quickly as 
possible, while making as few mistakes as possible. Participants were further told that they 
would see words presented before the positive and negative words and that they should not 
respond to those words. Participants were then shown a list of the 14 positive and 14 negative 
words that they would have to categorize. In-line with standard procedures (Spruyt, De 
Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007), a single trial consisted of a fixation cross presented in 
white for 500 ms, a blank screen for 500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, a post-prime pause for 50 
ms and the presentation of a target word in white font or 1500 ms. The inter-trial interval was 
set to vary randomly between 500 ms and 1500 ms. There were four types of trials: (1) trials 
with the word LOKANTA as prime and a positive word as target, (2) trials with the word 
LOKANTA and a negative target, (3) trials with the word FEVKANI and a positive target, 
and (4) trials with the word FEVKANI and a negative target. Each type of trials was presented 
on a quarter of the trials. Participants first completed eight practice trials (two of each of the 
four types of trials) and then completed 120 trials separated into three blocks of 40 trials, each 
containing 10 of the four types of trials, presented in random order. 
AMP (Experiment 3). In accordance with standard procedures (Payne et al., 2005), 
the AMP consisted of 3 blocks of 30 trials in which participants were presented with a prime 
stimulus for 75ms, a blank screen for 125ms, and a Chinese ideograph for 100ms, which was 
then covered with a black-and-white pattern mask. The three brands Empeya, Levida and 
Witkap served as prime stimuli. Each trial, participants indicated if they considered the 
MERE EXPOSURE  12 
Chinese ideograph more or less visually pleasant than average by pressing either “I” or “E”, 
respectively. Participants were asked to ignore the prime stimuli and respond only to the 
Chinese ideographs. 
Stimulus frequency memory measurement. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were asked to indicate how many times th y had seen each of the two words or 
the three brands during the first (ME) task. Participants could choose a number between 0 and 
15 from a dropdown list for each stimulus. The order of the questions was randomized. 
Task engagement measurement. In Experiment 3, we assessed task engagement for 
the ME phase by asking participants to rate their levels of boredom and attention in this task 
with two 10-point rating scales (short version of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire; 
Helton & Naswall, 2015). 
Results 
Data-preparation 
IAT ME scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003), such that higher scores indicate a stronger ME effect (i.e., a stronger preference for the 
frequently-presented word over the infrequently-presented word). EPT ME scores 
(Experiment 2) were created by (a) subtracting the mean latencies on trials with a positive 
target and the frequent word prime from the mean latencies on trials with a negative target and 
the frequent word prime, (b) subtracting the mean latencies on trials with a positive target and 
the infrequent word prime from the mean latencies on trials with a negative target and the 
infrequent word prime, and (c) subtracting the second difference score from the first 
difference score. EPT ME scores were calculated on the basis of EPT trials that remained after 
exclusion of trials with an incorrect response (3.5%) and trials with reaction times that were at 
least 2.5 standard deviations removed from an indivdual’s mean for that type of trial (2.9%). 
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Three AMP ME scores (Experiment 3) were calculated for each participant by subtracting the 
proportion of “pleasant” responses on (a) trials with the brand presented 0 times as prime 
from trials with the brand presented 12 times as prime (0-12 ME score), (b) trials with the 
brand presented 0 times as prime from trials with the brand presented 2 times as prime (0-2 
ME score), and (c) trials with the Brand presented 2 times as prime from trials with the Brand 
presented 12 times as prime (2-12 ME score). The Sparman-Brown corrected split-half 
reliability was r(748) = .86 (Experiment 1) and r(590) = .87 (Experiment 2) for the IAT ME 
scores, r(597) = .43 for the EPT ME scores, and r(954) = [.51-.61] for the AMP ME scores. 
Explicit rating ME scores were calculated by subtracting participants’ score rating for 
the infrequent word from their score rating for thefrequent word (Experiments 1 and 2). For 
Experiment 3, three explicit rating ME scores were calculated by subtracting ratings for the 
infrequent brands from ratings for the frequent brands (0-12 ME score, 0-2 ME score, 2-12 
ME scores). Explicit rating ME scores correlated signif cantly with IAT ME scores (r[747] = 
.32, p < .001 [Experiment 1], r[590] = .27, p < .001 [Experiment 2]), and AMP ME scores 
(r[953] = .22 [0-12 ME scores], r[953] = .21 [0-2 ME scores], r[953] = .21 [2-12 ME scores], 
ps < .001 [Experiment 3]), but not EPT ME scores (r[597] = .05, p = .18 [Experiment 2]).  
Stimulus frequency memory was coded as accurate for participants who correctly 
indicated that the frequent word was presented more oft n than the infrequent word 
(Experiment 1: 392 participants, 52.3%; Experiment 2: 690 participants, 57.9%; Experiment 
3: 0-12 pair: 808 participants, 84.7%; 0-2 pair: 711 participants, 74.5%; 2-12 pair: 719 
participants, 75.3%). It was coded as reversed for participants who indicated that the frequent 
word was presented less often than the infrequent word (Experiment 1: 116 participants, 
15.5%; Experiment 2: 176 participants, 14.8%; Experiment 3: 0-12 pair: 90 participants, 
9.4%; 0-2 pair: 164 participants, 17.2%; 2-12 pair: 127 participants, 13.3%) and as 
indiscriminate for participants who indicated that both words had been presented equally 
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often (Experiment 1: 241 participants, 32.2%; Experiment 2: 325 participants, 27.3%; 
Experiment 3: 0-12 pair: 57 participants, 5.9%; 0-2 pair: 80 participants, 8.3%; 2-12 pair: 109 
participants, 11.4%). We also created an index of subjective ME Experience by subtracting the 
number of reported stimulus presentations for the infrequent word from the number of 
reported stimulus presentations for the frequent word. In Experiment 1, participants with 
accurate memory indicated smaller differences in the number of presentations for the 0-2 pair 
(M = 2.33, SD = 1.48) than for the 1-3 (M = 3.05, SD = 2.03), 1-6 (M = 5.97, SD = 3.62), and 
1-12 pair (M = 9.21, SD = 4.17), ps < .014. In Experiment 2, participants with accurate 
memory indicated smaller differences for the 0-2 (M = 3.21, SD = 3.00) than for the 1-12 pair 
(M = 8.09, SD = 4.25), t(688) = 16.82, p < .001. In Experiment 3, participants with accurate 
memory indicated smaller differences for the 0-2 pair (M = 4.17, SD = 2.62) than for the 2-12 
(M = 6.78, SD = 3.37) or 0-12 pair (M = 8.83, SD = 4.22), ps < .001. 
Implicit Evaluation 
IAT. In Experiment 1, IAT ME scores were significantly hig er than zero, indicating a 
ME effect on IAT performance (M = 0.07, SD = 0.48), t(748) = 4.14, p < .001, dz = 0.15, 95% 
confidence interval (CI) = [0.04, 0.11], BF1 = 190.51. We performed an ANOVA on IAT ME 
scores that included Memory (accurate, indiscriminate, reversed), IAT Block Order (positive 
words and frequent word categorized with the same key in the first block, positive words and 
infrequent word categorized with the same key in the first block), Task Order (implicit 
evaluation task first, explicit evaluation task first), and Stimulus Pair (0-2, 1-3, 1-6, 1-12) as 
between-subjects factors.1 This revealed only a main effect of IAT Block Orde, F(1, 701) = 
5.21, p = .032, but not any other main or interaction effects, Fs < 3.11, ps > .078.2 Planned 
                                                 
1 For all experiments, we also performed ANOVA’s that did not include the Memory factor. These analyses 
revealed the same significant effects. 
2 Because the main aim of our experiments was to quantify evidence for the presence or absence of an effect in 
any of the different memory and ME condition groups (and our experiment was specifically designed for this) 
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one-sample t-tests indicated that participants with accurate memory significantly preferred the 
frequent word (M = 0.10, SD = 0.48), t(391) = 4.21, p < .001, dz = 0.21, 95% CI = [0.05, 
0.15], BF1 = 303.78. We did not observe a ME effect for participants with indiscriminate or 
reversed memory, ts < 1.49, ps > .13, dzs < 0.10, BF0s > 4.62. The ME effect for participants 
with accurate memory was significant only for the 0-2 pair (M = 0.16, SD = 0.44), t(77) = 
3.25, p = .001, dz = 0.37, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.26], BF1 = 15.12, and the 1-12 pair (M = 0.13, SD 
= 0.50), t(130) = 2.91, p = .004, dz = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.21], BF1 = 5.44, but not the 1-3 
pair (M = 0.13, SD = 0.50), t(72) = 1.95, p = .055, dz = 0.23, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.22], BF0 = 
1.33, or the 1-6 pair (M = 0.02, SD = 0.46), t(109) = 0.46, p = .64, dz = 0.04, 95% CI = [-0.07, 
0.11], BF0 = 8.52. A summary of the t-test results is provided in Table 1. 
In Experiment 2, IAT ME scores also indicated a ME effect on IAT performance (M = 
0.09, SD = 0.49), t(591) = 4.41, p < .001, dz = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.13], BF1 = 623.02. An 
ANOVA on IAT ME scores with Memory, IAT Block Order and Stimulus Pair as factors 
revealed a significant main effect of IAT Block Orde , F(1, 585) = 13.46, p < .001, but no 
other main or interaction effects, Fs < 2.09, ps > .12. We observed a significant ME effect for 
participants with accurate memory (M = 0.12, SD = 0.45), t(324) = 4.62, p < .001, dz = 0.26, 
95% CI = [0.07, 0.16], BF1 = 1754.95, but not for participants with indiscriminate or reversed 
memory, ts < 1.82, ps > .072, dzs < 0.13, BF0s > 2.50 (Table 2). Participants with accurate 
memory exhibited a significant ME effect for the 0-2 pair (M = 0.17, SD = 0.43), t(122) = 
4.45, p < .001, dz = 0.40, 95% CI = [0.10, 0.25], BF1 = 813.57, and the 1-12 pair (M = 0.08, 
                                                                                                                                              
we report separate t-tests for these different groups despite the fact tha the ANOVA did not reveal significant 
effects of Memory or Stimulus Pair. Bonferroni-correction sets the significance cut-off at p = .017 for the t-tests 
examining the effects in the three memory groups and at p = .013 for the t-tests examining the effects in the four 
ME condition groups. Multiple comparisons are not a problem for the Bayes Factors (see Dienes, 2016).  
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SD = 0.46), t(201) = 2.48, p = .014, dz = 0.17, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.14], but the evidence for the 
latter effect was only anecdotal, BF1 = 1.54.
3 
EPT. Overall, EPT ME scores in Experiment 2 did not differ significantly from zero 
(M = -1.02, SD = 120.87), t(598) = -0.21, p = .84, dz = 0.01, 95% CI = [-10.72, 8.67], BF0 = 
21.30. An ANOVA on EPT ME scores that included Memory, Task Order and Stimulus Pair 
as factors revealed a significant main effect of Memory, F(2, 593) = 3.98, p = .019. We 
observed a contrast ME effect for participants with indiscriminate memory (M = -34.09, SD = 
162.43), t(137) = -2.47, p = .015, dz = -0.21, 95% CI = [-61.43, -6.75], but evidence for this 
effect was only anecdotal, BF1 = 1.75. We did not observe significant ME effects for
participants with accurate or reversed memory, ts < 1.84, ps > .068, dzs < 0.11, BF0s > 3.26, 
or for participants with accurate memory for any of the stimulus pairs, ts < 1.58, ps > .11, dzs 
< 0.12, BF0s > 3.68 (Table 2). Additional between-subjects t-tests indicated that standardized 
IAT ME scores were significantly larger than standardized EPT ME scores for Experiment 2 
participants with accurate memory for the 0-2 pair, t(294) = 3.00, p = .001, BF1 = 18.04, but 
not the 1-12 pair, t(392) = 0.49, p = .31, BF0 = 5.84. 
AMP. AMP ME scores in Experiment 3 were significantly higher than zero, indicating 
a ME effect on AMP performance (M = 1.02%, SD = 18.33%), t(2867) = 2.97, p = .003, dz = 
0.06, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.34%, 1.69%], BF1 = 11.16. An ANOVA on AMP ME 
scores that included Stimulus Pair (0-12, 0-2, 2-12) as within-subject factor and Memory 
(accurate, indiscriminate, reversed) and Task Order (implicit evaluation task first, explicit 
evaluation task first) as between-subjects factors revealed only a main effect of Task Order, 
χ
2(1) = 4.22, p = .040, indicating bigger ME effects when participants started with the AMP, 
but not any other main or interaction effects, χ2s < 6.99, ps > .13. Planned follow-up t-tests 
indicated that participants with accurate memory significantly preferred the frequent word (M 
                                                 
3 Note that the effect was significant at the Bonferroni-corrected p-value for two comparisons of p = .025.  
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= 1.29%, SD = 17.81%), t(2237) = 3.43, p < .001, dz = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.55%, 2.03%], BF1 = 
52.57. We did not observe a ME effect for participants with indiscriminate or reversed 
memory, ts < 0.45, ps > .65, dzs < 0.03, BF0s > 2.98. The ME effect for participants with 
accurate memory was significant for the 0-12 pair (M = 1.79%, SD = 18.96%), t(807) = 2.68, 
p = .008, dz = 0.09, 95% CI = [0.48%, 3.10%], BF1 = 8.10, and the 0-2 pair (M = 1.31%, SD = 
17.12%), t(710) = 2.04, p = .042, dz = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.48%, 2.57%], BF1 = 1.99, but not the 
2-12 pair (M = 0.72%, SD = 17.14%), t(718) = 1.12, p = .26, dz = 0.04, 95% CI = [-0.54%, 
1.97%], BF0 = 2.22 (Table 3).  
In-line with our pre-registered data analysis plan, we performed additional analyses 
excluding participants who reported low task engagement in the ME task (mean score < 3; 
overall mean = 4.66, SD = 2.09). In these analyses, the same effects were significant as in the 
other analyses with the exception that we now observed a significant interaction effect of Task 
Order and Memory, χ2(2) = 10.63, p = .005, indicating a Memory main effect for participants 
who started with the explicit rating task, χ2(2) = 9.18, p = .010, but not for participants who 
started with the AMP, χ2(2) = 4.33, p = .11.4 
Compound analysis. The performed ANOVA’s on implicit evaluation scores did not 
provide clear evidence for a moderation of ME effects by Memory or Stimulus Pair. To 
explore whether this might be due to a lack of statistical power in these analyses, we decided 
to perform additional ANOVA’s on standardized IAT and AMP ME scores (but not EPT ME 
scores) for participants in all experiments. These analyses also allowed us to compare ME 
effects on IAT and AMP scores. 
First, an ANOVA that included Memory and Implicit Evaluation Task revealed a main 
effect of Task, F(1, 4203) = 6.07, p = .014, indicating stronger effects on IAT scores than on 
AMP scores. More importantly, we also observed a main effect of Memory, F(2, 4203) = 
                                                 
4 We also performed pre-registered exploratory analyses with different procedures for coding memory accura y. 
These analyses generally produced similar results. A report of these analyses can be found on the OSF webpage. 
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3.99, p = .019. There was a significant ME effect for participants with accurate memory (M = 
0.11, SD = 0.97), t(2954) = 6.02, p < .001, dz = 0.11, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.14], BF1 >10.000, or 
with indiscriminate memory (M = 0.08, SD = 1.06), t(676) = 2.06, p = .039, dz = 0.08, 95% CI 
= [0.004, 0.165], BF1 = 2.14, but not for participants with reversed memory (M = 0.01, SD = 
1.07), t(576) = 0.18, p = .86, dz = 0.01, 95% CI = [-0.08, 0.10], BF0 = 5.44. Note that the 
evidence for a ME effect for participants with indiscriminate memory was only anecdotal. 
However, there is substantial evidence for the absence of a difference in effect sizes between 
participants with accurate and indiscriminate memory, BF0 = 5.34. 
Second, we performed an ANOVA for participants with accurate memory that included 
Implicit Evaluation Task (AMP, IAT) as well as 2 Stimulus Pair variables: (1) Infrequent 
Stimulus Presentation (whether the infrequent stimulus was presented or not) and (2) 
Difference in Number of Presentations for the Frequent and Infrequent Stimulus (range 2-10). 
This revealed a main effect of Evaluation Task, F(1, 2950) = 17.35, p < .001, as well as a 
main effect of Infrequent Stimulus Presentation, F(1, 2951) = 4.01, p = .045. The ME effect 
was stronger when the infrequent stimulus was not presented (M = 0.14, SD = 0.98) than 
when it was presented (M = 0.04, SD = 0.96). Notably, however, ME effects were significant 
for both types of stimulus pairs, ps < .001, BF1s > 79.  
Explicit Evaluation 
Experiments 1 and 2. Overall, explicit rating ME scores were significantly higher 
than zero, indicating a ME effect on explicit ratings (M = 0.13, SD = 2.01), t(1939) = 2.93, p = 
.003, dz = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.22], BF1 = 11.82. An ANOVA on explicit rating ME scores 
that included Memory, Task Order and Stimulus Pair as factors did not reveal any main or 
interaction effects, Fs < 1.71, ps >.16. The ME effect was significant for participants with 
accurate memory (M = 0.19, SD = 1.99), t(1081) = 3.12, p = .002, dz = 0.09, 95% CI = [0.07, 
0.31], BF1 = 25.44, and non-significant for participants with reversed or indiscriminate 
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memory, ts < 1.34, ps >.18, dzs < 0.06, BF0s > 1.52. We observed a significant ME effect for 
participants with accurate memory for the 0-2 pair (M = 0.38, SD = 2.03), t(373) = 3.63, p < 
.001, dz = 0.19, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.59], BF1 = 146.28, but not for any of the other pairs, ts < 
1.06, ps > .29, dzs < 0.13, BF0s > 4.52 (Table 1). 
 Experiment 3. Explicit rating ME scores revealed a ME effect (M = 0.09, SD = 1.84), 
t(2867) = 2.73, p = .006, dz = 0.05, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.03, 0.16], BF1 = 5.66. 
An ANOVA on explicit rating ME scores that included Memory, Task Order and Stimulus Pair 
as factors did not reveal any main or interaction effects, χ2s < 5.67, ps >.059. The ME effect 
was significant for participants with accurate memory (M = 0.13, SD = 1.85), t(2237) = 3.28, 
p = .001, dz = 0.07, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.20], BF1 = 31.77, and non-significant for participants 
with reversed or indiscriminate memory, ts < -0.03, ps >.51, dzs < 0.00, BF0s > 4.41. The ME 
effect for participants with accurate memory was signif cant for the 0-12 stimulus pair (M = 
0.15, SD = 1.84), t(807) = 2.35, p = .019, dz = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.28], BF1 = 8.10, and 
the 0-2 stimulus pair (M = 0.19, SD = 1.83), t(710) = 2.83, p = .005, dz = 0.11, 95% CI = 
[0.06, 0.33], BF1 = 12.43, but not for the 2-12 stimulus pair (M = 0.04, SD = 1.88), t(718) = 
0.52, p = .61, dz = 0.02, 95% CI = [-0.10, 0.17], BF0 = 4.43. 
Compound analysis on implicit and explicit evaluation  
An ANOVA on standardized implicit and explicit evalu tion ME scores (excluding 
EPT scores) that included Memory, Task Order, Implicit Evaluation Task, and Type of 
Evaluation Task (implicit/explicit) revealed a significant main effect of Memory, χ2(2) = 6.67, 
p = .036, and a main effect of Type of Evaluation Task, χ2(1) = 4.41, p = .036, indicating 
stronger ME effects on implicit than explicit evalution tasks.5  
                                                 
5 We also performed statistical mediation analyses that indicated that the ME effect on implicit evaluation task 
performance was not mediated by changes in explicit ratings. In contrast, we did observe full mediation of the 
ME effect on explicit ratings by changes in IAT scores in Experiment 1 and 2 but this pattern did not replicate for 
AMP scores in Experiment 3. 
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Discussion 
In three experiments, we examined ME effects on implicit stimulus evaluations. 
Results showed that the frequent and infrequent presentation of non-existing words can 
produce significant changes in implicit evaluations f these words. The ME effect on implicit 
evaluations, however, depended on a number of boundary conditions. First, it was dependent 
on the task that was used to capture implicit evaluations. We obtained strong evidence for a 
ME effect on IAT scores (BF1s > 190) and AMP scores (BF1 > 11) and substantial evidence 
that ME does NOT influence EPT scores (BF0 > 21). Second, we obtained evidence that the 
ME effect depends on participants’ memory of the MEexperience. We observed a robust ME 
effect on IAT and AMP scores only when participants had accurate memory of which stimulus 
had been presented more often in the ME task. Third, our results indicate that the ME effect 
depends on the number of stimulus presentations. That is, we only observed a robust ME 
effect on IAT or AMP scores when the frequent word was presented two or twelve times and 
the infrequent word was never presented (i.e., for the 0-2/0-12 stimulus pairs). When the 
infrequent word was presented, ME effects were smaller overall and significant effects were 
only found when the infrequent word was presented only nce and the frequent word was 
presented more than six times (i.e., for the 1-12 pair but not the 1-3, 1-6, or 2-12 pairs). 
ME influences implicit evaluation 
The presence of a ME effect on implicit stimulus evaluations is important for a 
number of reasons. First, due to the generality of the ME effect, the widespread application of 
ME procedures for changing stimulus evaluation, and the relevance of implicit evaluation for 
behavior, this finding may have practical importance. Second, it also has important theoretical 
implications. More specifically, it contrasts with an important assumption of the processing 
fluency/attribution account of ME effects that these effects depend on the explicit 
measurement of evaluation. In Experiments 1 and 3, ME influenced IAT scores independent 
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of whether the IAT was performed before or after paticipants provided their explicit liking 
ratings. In Experiment 2, ME influenced IAT scores even though the IAT always preceded the 
explicit rating task. In other words, participants showed evidence of a ME effect on IAT 
scores without first actively reporting on the quality of their explicit evaluations. These 
findings accord with the assumption of other theoretical accounts that ME leads to an 
immediate change in stimulus liking even when participants do not have the task to rate their 
liking of the crucial stimuli (e.g., the hedonic/fluency account, propositional accounts). Our 
results also show that ME can influence implicit evaluations despite the fact that stimuli were 
exposed many times during the IAT, EPT, and AMP procedures. To further explore this issue, 
we performed additional analyses which showed that (1) effects on explicit evaluations were 
observed even for participants who first completed implicit evaluation tasks and (2) ME 
effects were observed on AMP scores in Experiment 3 even when excluding the first block of 
AMP trials. This resilience to re-exposure accords with the idea that propositional knowledge 
of stimulus frequencies during the ME phase drives ME effects rather than fluency 
experiences that result from repeated exposure (and therefore should not survive the following 
exposures).  
Our results also suggested that ME effects were stronger on implicit evaluations 
(except for the EPT effects) than on explicit evaluations. In accordance, we found evidence 
for a full mediation of ME effects on explicit rating scores by effects on IAT scores At first 
glance, these results are in-line with previous theorizing that ME effects are the result of 
implicit processes (e.g., in the sense of unaware) nd that such evaluations can be more easily 
probed with implicit evaluation measures (Kawakami, 2012). However, this does not fit with 
findings indicating an important role for memory for stimulus frequencies in ME effects. An 
alternative explanation is that explicit evaluation measures emphasize validation which might 
lead some participants to refrain from using the frequency of stimulus presentations as a basis 
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for evaluation. For instance, participants who learn that there is a difference in the number of 
stimulus frequencies might easily infer liking on the basis of this regularity. However, when 
asked to explicitly report their liking they might refrain from using this information because 
they do not consider it a good enough reason for changing liking. As we discuss below, this 
idea also accords with our findings regarding the moderating role of the number of stimulus 
exposures on ME effects on implicit and explicit evaluation. Note, however, that the overall 
difference in effect sizes between effects on implicit and explicit evaluations was very small 
and evidence for this difference in effect sizes waonly anecdotal. 
Moderators of ME effects on implicit (and explicit) evaluation 
The observation that a ME effect on implicit evaluations was observed only under 
certain conditions also raises many interesting issue . First, the dissociation between ME 
effects on the EPT versus AMP and IAT could be due to the fact that effects on the EPT tend 
to be smaller and more unreliable than those on IAT and AMP (De Houwer et al., 2009; 
Wittenbrink, 2007). 6 Hence, the EPT might simply have failed to capture implicit evaluations. 
In-line with this idea, correlational analyses revealed only a non-significant correlation 
between EPT scores and explicit rating scores. Thisfinding is noteworthy because especially 
for novel stimuli such as unfamiliar non-existing words stronger correlations between implicit 
and explicit evaluations are typically observed (Nosek, 2005). Another possibility is that EPT 
procedures hamper the observation of ME effects specifically. In accordance, it has been 
observed that although other evaluative learning procedures that include novel stimuli can 
lead to reliable EPT effects (e.g., approach-avoid learning: Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & 
Smith, 2015), ME instructions do not (see Van Dessel et al., 2017 for a discussion). One 
                                                 
6 To further investigate ME effects on EPT scores, we also performed analyses with item-based linear mixed 
effects models (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). This approach allowed us to investigate participants’ 
raw reaction times (RTs) rather than an index of their performance as combined in one (unreliable) EPT ME 
score and to control for possible effects of counterbalancing factors such as the target words or prime words that 
were used. Importantly, however, the linear mixed effects regression analyses supported the conclusion of the 
main analyses that EPT performance was not influenced by ME. 
MERE EXPOSURE  23 
potential explanation might be that evaluative priming effects result from semantic relatedness 
between target and prime stimuli rather than evaluative congruency (see Werner, Von Ramin, 
Spruyt & Rothermund, 2018). Whereas other evaluative learning procedures might allow 
novel stimuli to become semantically related to EPT targets (e.g., a novel stimulus that is 
repeatedly avoided might become related to target words such as ‘Loss’ or ‘Lonely’ which 
might allow for an evaluative priming effect), this might not be the case for ME (e.g., because 
presentation frequency does not readily relate to any of the EPT targets). Though further 
research is needed to test such explanations, it is clear that the current results highlight the 
importance of using multiple implicit measures of attitudes to avoid equating implicit 
evaluations with any one measurement procedure. 
Another important finding of our studies is that ME produced robust effects only for 
participants with accurate memory. This result is at odds with the proposal by Bornstein 
(1989) that memory of stimulus presentations is an important inhibitor of ME effects and 
reduces the size of ME effects. Rather, these results are in line with those of earlier studies 
showing that the ME effect necessarily involves conscious awareness of (1) the stimulus 
presentations (Brooks & Watkins, 1989; de Zilva, Vu, Newell, & Pearson, 2013; Newell & 
Shanks, 2007; Szpunar, Schellenberg, & Pliner, 2004) and (2) the frequency of occurrence of 
the stimuli (Stafford & Grimes, 2012). Our results extend these findings by showing that 
recognition memory also moderates ME effects on implicit evaluations. This contrasts with 
the assumption that ME effects observed on implicit evaluation measures more strongly 
reflect fluency-based processes that do not depend on conscious knowledge of stimulus 
frequencies (e.g., Kawakami, 2012). Moreover, results strongly resemble findings that 
contingency awareness is a potent moderator of EC and approach-avoidance effects on 
implicit and explicit evaluation (see Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 
2010; Van Dessel, De Houwer, & Gast, 2016).  
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One notable exception is that we did not observe rers d ME effects for participants 
with reversed memory, whereas reversed effects been observed in EC and approach-avoidance 
research (e.g., Van Dessel et al., 2016). Though this could be due to a lack of power to 
observe (typically smaller) reversed effects in ourstudies, it could also indicate that ME 
effects have different characteristics compared to EC and approach-avoidance effects (e.g., 
with regard to automaticity features). Indeed, our results do not provide definitive evidence 
that ME effects are non-automatic (e.g., in the sense of controlled or conscious). For instance, 
we measured participants’ memory of which of two stimuli occurs most often with a single 
question that followed the ME task and evaluation tasks. It is possible that a third variable 
determines both ME effects and participants’ answer to this question such that more robust 
ME effects are observed when participants have accur te memory. For instance, fluency 
experiences or familiarity feelings might not only facilitate stimulus liking but also a higher 
frequency response in the memory test. Hence, it is at least possible that participants exhibited 
ME effects and accurate memory yet were unaware of the number of presentations during 
evaluation. Another possibility is that participants with accurate memory were more attentive 
or engaged in the experiment and this moderated both ME effects and memory test 
performance. In contrast with this attention explanation, however, Experiment 3 found a 
moderation of AMP ME effects by memory even for participants who reported high ME task 
engagement. In addition, Wang and Chang (2004) found that participants preferred a stimulus 
they were not familiar with - but that they mistakenly classified as being familiar - over a 
stimulus that they had been exposed to before - but that they mistakenly classified as 
unfamiliar. Thus, the judged old/new status of a stimulus was more important to determine the 
liking of a stimulus than the actual previous exposure to the stimulus. This result suggests that 
memory is an important causal factor for the ME effect, rather than merely being correlated 
with it. The current results thus add to the cumulating evidence that memory of the stimuli 
MERE EXPOSURE  25 
and the stimulus presentations is an important precondition, rather than a limiting factor, for 
the ME effect (see also Montoya et al., 2017).  
Interestingly, our results provided (anecdotal) evid nce for a ME effect for participants 
with indiscriminate memory and substantial evidence for the absence of a difference in effect 
sizes between participants with accurate and indiscriminate memory. Though this might 
indicate that a proportion of the ME effect is not dependent on frequency memory, it could 
also reflect a ME effect for (1) participants who were able to retrieve frequency memory 
during the evaluation task but not the memory task or (2) participants who misinterpreted the 
memory task. 
Finally, our results also revealed another important boundary condition of ME effects, 
that is, the number of stimulus exposures. ME effects were generally bigger when the 
infrequent stimulus was never presented. Moreover, for the 0-2 pair we consistently found a 
robust ME effect implicit and explicit evaluation, but not for pairs with larger differences in 
the number of stimulus presentations (except for a rel tively smaller ME effect for the 0-12 
and 1-12 pairs). This downturn in the frequency-affect curve has been observed in other ME 
studies as well (Harrison, 1977; Zajonc, Shaver, Tavris, & van Kreveld, 1972; see Montoya et 
al., 2017 for a review). One popular explanation of this observation is that participants may 
engage in a correction process and consciously revise their initial evaluation when they 
become more strongly aware of the differences in occurrences (Gilbert, 1989; Trope, 1986). 
In-line with this idea, we obtained initial evidence that the negative impact of exposure 
frequency on ME effects depends on the task that is used to measure evaluations. More 
specifically, we found robust evidence for ME effects on implicit evaluations not only for the 
0-2 pair but also for the 1-6, 1-12, and 0-12 pair. In contrast, we only found strong evidence 
for an effect on explicit evaluations for the 0-2 pair. One possible explanation for this 
dissociation is that for the 0-2 pair participants have less motivation  control against changes 
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in liking because the frequent stimulus is only presented on two occasions (which might, for 
instance, prevent boredom due to overexposure; see Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998). The 
current results thus suggest that implicit evaluation measures can be an important addition to 
explicit evaluation measures in the context of ME effects in that they might sometimes 
capture ME effects that are not registered with explicit evaluation measures (e.g., due to 
controlled correction processes related to overexposure; see Kawakami et al., 2010 for 
corroborative evidence). This accords with recent evidence that certain learning procedures 
such as approach-avoidance training sometimes influe ce implicit but not explicit evaluation 
when participants do not consider the learned regularity a good basis for their evaluation (Van 
Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, Smith, & De Schryver, 2016).  
Limitations 
An important limitation of our studies is that they do not provide clarity about the 
reasons why ME effects on implicit evaluations were influenced by certain moderators such 
as the number of stimulus presentations or the nature of the implicit evaluation task. Our 
study was originally set up with a propositional account of ME effects in mind, for which we 
found initial support in a study that revealed effects of ME instructions on implicit evaluations 
(Van Dessel et al., 2017). It is noteworthy that the current results seem to mirror those of the 
ME instruction study. In that study, effects of ME instructions were observed only on implicit 
evaluations measured with an IAT and AMP and not with an EPT. Moreover, ME instructions 
influenced evaluations only when participants could correctly report which of the two words 
would occur most often and ME instruction effects were bigger on implicit than on explicit 
evaluation measures. These similarities might be viewed as indirect support for the idea that 
ME effects (in part) depend on similar (propositional) mechanisms as ME instruction effects. 
On the other hand, the observed similarities between ME and ME instruction effects could 
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also arise because the specific moderators influence the (distinct) mechanisms underlying ME 
and ME instruction effects to a similar extent. 
Another important limitation is that we did not probe the relation between ME effects 
on implicit evaluation and real-world behavior. This requires further study especially given 
recent evidence that changes in implicit evaluations (as measured with the IAT) sometimes do 
not mediate changes in other relevant behavior (e.g., Forscher et al., 2017; but see: Friese et 
al., 2009). Finally, it is important to note that all the observed ME effects were of small effect 
size (all dzs < 0.41). Of course that was not unique to effects on implicit measures; our data 
suggests that, if anything, effects are larger on implicit measures than on explicit measures. 
Hence, though our experiments were well-powered to find an overall ME effect, they had less 
statistical power to find robust evidence for effects of the different between-subjects factors 
and their interactions.  
The current results thus provide many clues for future research that might look into 
ME (and ME instruction) effects on (implicit) evalution and further test moderation by (1) 
the number of presentation frequencies, (2) memory, and (3) (implicit vs. explicit) evaluation 
measurement tasks (e.g., in different domains). These studies will not only allow us to gain 
more insight into the mental processes underlying ME effects but also implicit (and explicit) 
evaluation, memory, or human cognition in general. For instance, research examining why 
ME does not influence EPT effects can help us understand the cognitive underpinnings of 
priming-related mental processes whereas research on dissociative effects of the number of 
presentation frequencies on implicit and explicit evaluation might provide information about 
the controllability of ME and the (automaticity of) processes underlying reactance responses. 
Importantly, however, the present studies do allow us to already make at least two 
important new conclusions with a high degree of confide ce (1) ME procedures can influence 
implicit evaluations as measured with an IAT and AMP, and (2) this effect can occur even in 
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the absence of explicit evaluation. This is important information that might shed new light on 
the mental mechanisms underlying ME (which has proven difficult so far; see Montoya et al., 
2017). Moreover, the fact that our data raise many new questions is important because those 
questions are likely to stimulate new research. We therefore hope that our studies will provide 
the basis for many important future discoveries. 
  
MERE EXPOSURE  29 
References 
Bar-Anan, Y., De Houwer, J., & Nosek, B. (2010). Evaluative conditioning and conscious 
knowledge of contingencies: A correlational investiga on with large samples. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63(12), 2313–2335. 
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968-
1987. Psychological Bulletin, 106(2), 265–289. 
Bornstein, R. F., & D’Agostino, P. R. (1992). Stimulus recognition and the mere exposure 
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 545–552. 
Bornstein, R. F., & D’Agostino, P. R. (1994). The attribution and discounting of perceptual 
fluency: Preliminary tests of a perceptual fluency/attributional model of the mere 
exposure effect. Social Cognition, 12, 103–128.  
Brooks, J. O., & Watkins, M. J. (1989). Recognition memory and the mere exposure effect. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15(5), 968–76. 
De Houwer, J. (2014). A Propositional Model of Implicit Evaluation. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 8, 342-353. 
De Houwer, J., & Moors, A. (2010). Implicit measures: Similarities and differences. In. B. 
Gawronski & K. B. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of implicit social cognition: Measurement, 
theory, and applications (pp. 176-193). New York: Guilford. Press. 
De Houwer, J., Teige-Mocigemba, S., Spruyt, A., & Moors, A. (2009). Implicit measures: A 
normative analysis and review. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 347–368.  
de Zilva, D., Vu, L., Newell, B. R., & Pearson, J. (2013). Exposure is not enough: 
Suppressing stimuli from awareness can abolish the mere exposure effect. PLoS ONE, 
8(10).  
MERE EXPOSURE  30 
Dienes, Z. (2011). Bayesian versus orthodox statistics: Which side are you on? Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 6(3), 274–290.  
Dienes, Z. (2016). How Bayes factors change scientif c practice. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology, 72, 78–89.  
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit and explicit prejudice and 
interracial interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(1), 62–68. 
Eschenbeck, H., Heim-Dreger, U., Steinhilber, A., & Kohlmann, C.-W. (2016). Self-regulation 
of healthy nutrition: automatic and controlled processes. BMC Psychology, 4, 4. 
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the automatic 
activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 229–238. 
Forscher P. S., Lai C., Axt J., Ebersole C. R., Herman M., Nosek B. A. et al. (2017). A Meta-
Analysis of Change in Implicit Bias. Available at: h tps://osf.io/awz2p/ 
Friese, M., Hofmann, W., & Schmitt, M. (2009). When a d why do implicit measures predict 
behaviour? Empirical evidence for the moderating role of opportunity, motivation, and 
process reliance. European Review of Social Psychology, 19. 
Gilbert, D. T. (1989). Thinking lightly about others: Automatic components of the social 
inference process. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Unintended thought (pp. 189–
211). New York: Guilford Press. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1464–1480.  
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. a., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the Implicit 
Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social 
MERE EXPOSURE  31 
Psychology, 85(2), 197–216.  
Harmon-Jones, E., & Allen, J.B. (2001). The role of affect in the mere exposure effect: 
Evidence from psychophysiological and individual differences approaches. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 889-898. 
Harrison, A. A. (1977). Mere exposure. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental 
social psychology (pp. 39–83). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Hicks, J. A, & King, L. A. (2011). Subliminal mere exposure and explicit and implicit positive 
affective responses. Cognition & Emotion, 25(4), 726–9.  
Hofmann, W., De Houwer, J., Perugini, M., Baeyens, F., & Crombez, G. (2010). Evaluative 
conditioning in humans: a meta-analysis. P ychological Bulletin, 136(3), 390–421. 
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H.& Schmitt, M. (2005). A meta-
analysis on the correlation between the implicit association test and explicit self-report 
measures. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(10), 1369–85. 
Janiszewski, C. (1993). Preattentive mere exposure effects. Journal of Consumer Research, 
20, 376.  
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kawakami, N. (2012). The implicit influence of a negative mood on the subliminal mere 
exposure effect. Perceptual and motor skills, 115(3), 715-724. 
Kawakami, N., & Yoshida, F. (2015). How do implicit effects of subliminal mere exposure 
become explicit? Mediating effects of social interaction. Social Influence, 10(1), 43-54. 
Kawakami, N., Sato, H., & Yoshida, F. (2010). Effects of mere exposure on category 
evaluation measured by the IAT and the GNAT. Shinrigaku Kenkyu, 81(5), 437–445.  
Mandler, G., Nakamura, Y., & Van Zandt, B. J. (1987). Nonspecific effects of exposure on 
MERE EXPOSURE  32 
stimuli that cannot be recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 13(4), 646–648.  
Monahan, J. L., Murphy, S. T., & Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Subliminal mere exposure: Specific, 
general, and diffuse effects. Psychological Science, 11(6), 462–466.  
Montoya, R. M., Horton, R. S., Vevea, J. L., Citkowicz, M., & Lauber, E. A. (2017). A re-
examination of the mere exposure effect: The influece of repeated exposure on 
recognition, familiarity, and liking. Psychological Bulletin, 143(5), 459–498.  
Newell, B. R. B., & Shanks, D. D. R. (2007). Recognising what you like: Examining the 
relation between the mere-exposure effect and recogniti n. European Journal of 
Cognitive Psychology, 19(1), 103–118.  
Nosek, B. A. (2005). Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(4), 565–584.  
Olson, M. A, & Fazio, R. H. (2004). Reducing the influence of extrapersonal associations on 
the Implicit Association Test: Personalizing the IAT. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 86(5), 653–667.  
Payne, B. K., Cheng, C. M., Govorun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for attitudes: 
affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89(3), 277–293.  
Pliner, P. (1982). The effects of mere exposure on liki g for edible substances. Appetite, 3(3), 
283–290.  
Rothermund, K., & Wentura, D. (2004). Underlying processes in the implicit association test: 
Dissociating salience from associations. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
133(2), 139–165.  
MERE EXPOSURE  33 
Rouder, J. N., Speckman, P. L., Sun, D., Morey, R. D., & Iverson, G. (2009). Bayesian t tests 
for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis. P ychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 
225–237.  
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: 
Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allow presenting anything as 
significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366 
Smith, P. K., Dijksterhuis, A., & Chaiken, S. (2008). Subliminal exposure to faces and racial 
attitudes: Exposure to Whites makes Whites like Blacks less. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 44(1), 50-64. 
Smith, C. T., De Houwer, J., & Nosek, B. a. (2013). Consider the source: persuasion of 
implicit evaluations is moderated by source credibility. Personality & Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 39(2), 193–205.  
Spruyt, A., De Houwer, J., Hermans, D., & Eelen, P. (2007). Affective priming of nonaffective 
semantic categorization responses. Experimental Psychology, 54(1), 44–53.  
Stafford, T., & Grimes, A. (2012). Memory enhances the mere exposure effect. Psychology & 
Marketing, 29(12), 995–1003.  
Szpunar, K. K., Schellenberg, E. G., & Pliner, P. (2004). Liking and memory for musical 
stimuli as a function of exposure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 30, 370 – 381. 
Trope, Y. (1986). Identification and inferential processes in dispositional attribution. 
Psychological Review, 93(3), 239–257.  
Vadillo, M. A., Konstantinidis, E., & Shanks, D. R. (2016). Underpowered samples, false 
negatives, and unconscious learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 87–102. 
MERE EXPOSURE  34 
Van den Bergh, O., & Vrana, S. R. (1998). Repetition and boredom in a perceptual fluency/ 
attributional model of affective judgements. Cognition & Emotion, 12(4), 533–553.  
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., & Gast, A. (2016). Approach-avoidance training effects are 
moderated by awareness of stimulus-action contingencies. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 42(1), 81–93.  
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., & Smith, C. T. (2015). Instruction-based approach-
avoidance effects. Experimental Psychology, 62(3), 161–169.  
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Gast, A., Smith, C. T., & De Schryver, M. (2016). Instructing 
Implicit Processes: When Instructions to Approach or Avoid Influence Implicit but not 
Explicit Evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 63, 1-9.  
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Roets, A., & Gast, A. (2016). Failures to Change Stimulus 
Evaluations by means of Subliminal Approach and Avoidance Training. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 110, e1-e15.  
Van Dessel, P., Mertens, G., Smith, C. T., & De Houwer, J. (2017). The mere exposure 
instruction effect : Mere exposure instructions influence liking. Experimental 
Psychology, 64(5), 299-314. 
Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2007). A practical solution to the pervasive problems ofp values. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14(5), 779–804.  
Wang, M.-Y., & Chang, H.-C. (2004). The mere exposure effect and recognition memory. 
Cognition & Emotion, 18, 1055–1078.  
Werner, B., von Ramin, E., Spruyt, A., & Rothermund, K. (2018). Does sunshine prime 
loyal...or summer? Effects of associative relatedness on the evaluative priming effect in 
the valent/neutral categorisation task. Cognition & Emotion, 32, 222-230. 
 
MERE EXPOSURE  35 
Whittlesea, B.W.A. (1993), Illusions of Familiarity, Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1235–1253. 
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at eas  puts a smile on the face: 
Psychophysiological evidence that processing facilit tion elicits positive affect. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 989–1000. 
Winkielman, P., Halberstadt, J., Fazendeiro, T., & Catty, S. (2006). Prototypes are attractive 
because they are easy on the mind. Psychological Science, 17, 799-807. 
Wittenbrink, B. (2007). Measuring attitudes through priming. In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz 
(Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes: Progress and controversies (pp. 17–58). New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Witvliet, C., & Vrana, S. (2007). Play it again Sam: Repeated exposure to emotionally 
evocative music polarizes liking and smiling responses, and influences other affect 
reports, facial EMG, and heart rate. Cognition & Emotion, 21, 3–25. 
Zajonc, R. (1968). Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology Monographs, 9(2), 1–27. 
Zajonc, R. B. (2001). Mere exposure: A gateway to the subliminal. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 10(6), 224–228.  
Zajonc, R. B., Shaver, P., Tavris, C., & van Kreveld, D. (1972). Exposure, satiation, and 
stimulus discriminability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21(3), 270–80. 
Zebrowitz, L. A., White, B., & Wieneke, K. (2008). Mere exposure and racial prejudice: 
Exposure to other-race faces increases liking for strangers of that race. Social Cognition, 
26(3), 259–275.  
